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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT 
0 1F T'HE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES P. KNUCKLES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMP ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12254 
BRIEF O·F AP'P'ELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appeal concerns the right of plaintiff-respondent 
to recover under the terms of a group death and dismem-
berment insurance policy because of an eye injury. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT' 
The lower court held in favor of plaintiff ruling 
that plaintiff had suffered the "total and irrecoverable 
loss of sight of one eye" within the meaning of the 
group insurance policy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant - appellant seeks reversal of the lower 
court's decision. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are relatively simple and 
undisputed. 
On February 23, 1967, while he was operating an 
ore loading machine at his place of employment, plain-
tiff was struck in the right eye by a foreign object. 
(Tr. at 8) The foreign object penetrated the crystalline 
lens of the eye causing a traumatic cataract or opaque-
ness of the lens to form. (Deposition of James P. Rigg, 
Sr. at 9-12.) Between February 27, 1967 and March 1, 
1968, plaintiff underwent three operative procedures to 
remove completely the crystalline lens. (Id. at 14-20.) 
Plaintiff's physician furnished plaintiff with a contact 
lens for the injured eye, together with a bifocal forward 
lens. (Deposition of Robert 'N. Rigg at 6; Tr. at 15.) 
During 1969, plaintiff had two surgical procedures per-
formed to correct a muscle imbalance in his injured 
eye. (Deposition of James P. Rigg, Sr. at 10.) 
At the present time plaintiff's injured eye is physio-
logically normal except for the loss of the crystalline 
lens and a slight scar on the cornea. (Deposition of 
James P. Rigg, Sr. at 25.) Plaintiff's physician testified 
that with the corrective lenses, plaintiff has essentially 
normal vision or 20/20 minus three visual acuity. (Id. 
at 27.) Without correction, plaintiff can see large object~, 
lightness and darkness. However, the naked eye is of 
little practical use to plaintiff. (Tr. at 11, 39.) 
2 
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Plaintiff was insured as an employee of Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Company under a group insurance policy with 
defendant for accidental death or dismembe,rment. The 
policy provided for payment to the insured of a speci-
fied amount in the event the insured suffered the "total 
and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye." (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, at 3.) 
After the hearing in this matter, the lower court 
held that the plaintiff had suffered the "total and irre-
coverable loss of sight of one eye" within the meaning 
of the subject policy, reasoning that plaintiff had lost 
the practical use of his eye and that the effect of arti-
ficial lenses on plaintiff's sight need not be taken into 
consideration. (Tr. at 42-44; paragraph 3 of Order dated 
September 14, 1970.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS ENTIRE CASE INVOLVES A QUESTION 
OF LAW. 
The basic issue m this case is an issue of law; 
namely, whether plaintiff has snff ered the total and 
irrecoverable loss of sight within the meaning of the 
subject policy when he enjoys normal vision with the 
aid of corrective lenses. At trial, there was no dispute 
that because of the removal of the crystalline lens, plain-
tiff's naked eye is of little practical use to him. It was 
also undisputed that with the corrective lenses prescribed 
by his physician, plaintiff's vision in the injured eye is 
essentially normal. On the basis of these undisputed 
3 
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facts, the lower court reached its decision based on its 
interpretation of the applicable law. Because this case 
presents a legal que·stion, the lower court's interpreta.. 
tion of the law carries with it no presumptive validity. 
This Court is the proper and ultimate tribunal to decide 
the question of law on which this case turns. 
POINT II 
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE SUBJECT INSUR-
ANCE POLICY DEFEATS PLAINTIFF'S RECOV-
ERY. 
Insurance contracts "are subject to the same con-
struction as any other contract, in accordance with the 
expressed intent of the parties." Utah Farm Bureau 
Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 402, 315 P.2d 277, 
279 (1957). Although there is a rule that doubt or ambi-
guity in a contract of insurance is to be continued in 
favor of the insured and against the insurer, see Brown-
ing v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 
94 Utah 532, 543-45, 72 P.2d 1060, 1065-66 (1937), the 
rule does not have the effect of "making a plain con-
tract doubtful or ambiguous and then interpreting it in 
favor of the insured." Home Life Ins. Co. of New York 
v. Stewart, 114 F.2d 516, 517 (10th Cir. 1940). No 
forced or strained meaning will be given to words that 
is contrary to the obvious intent of the parties, Sump 
v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 21 Mich. App. 160, 
175 N.W.2d 44, 46 (1970). The natural and obvious 
meaning of the provisions in a contract is to be adopted 
in preference to a fanciful, curious or hidden meaning. 
Home Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Stewart, supra at 517. 
4 
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In order to be entitled to coverage, plaintiff's loss 
of sight in his injured eye must be "total and irrecover-
able." These terms are not indefinite or ambiguous. 
See Sump v. St. Paul Fire and Marines Ins. Co., supra; 
Bolich v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 43, 
169 S.E. 826, 828 (1933). Webster defines "total" as 
meaning "complete," "utter," or "absolute." Irrecover-
able is defined as meaning "not capable of being recov-
ered, regained, remedied or rectified." (Webster's New 
International Dictionary (2d ed. 1943).) In light of these 
definitions, plaintiff's loss of sight is neither total nor 
irrecoverable. 
Plaintiff is not blind in his injured eye. (Tr. at 39.) 
His e,ye is physiologically normal except for the loss 
of the crystalline lens. (Deposition of James P. Rigg, 
Sr. at 25.) He can see large objects and darkness and 
light. (Tr. at 11.) Therefore, his loss of sight is not 
complete, utter or absolute. 
Moreover, plaintiff's impairment of vision has been 
virtually restored by surgery and by the use of a small 
contact lens. The extent of sight recovery is candidly 
detailed by plaintiff's physician, Dr. James P. Rigg, Sr., 
in his correspondence to the company physican of plain-
tiff's employer, Dr. James Alexander: 
James Alexander, M.D. 
Moab, Utah 4-10-67 
P.S. It was a pleasure to see James Knuckles 
again a few days ago. ~ith a corre~tio~, h~ r~a~ 
about 20/80 with the right eye which is s1gmfi-
5 
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cantly good. I believe that eventually with a con-
tact lens he will have almost normal vision. 
J.P.R. 
April 24, 1967 
James Alexander, M.D. 
Moab, Utah 
My dear Alex: 
You will be amazed - James Knuckles, with a 
correction, read 20/20 today. I see no reason 
why he should not return to work at your discre-
tion. We would like to evaluate him in three 
weeks; but it should be another six or eight weeks 
before contact lens can be prescribed. Naturally, 
he will have protective safety glasses. 
JPR:gf 
James Alexander, M.D. 
Re: James Knuckles 
May 6, 1967 
Jubilantly yours, 
James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D. 
James Knuckles was in a day or two ago. He 
is doing all right, but a little capsular remnant 
has floated into the direct line of vision. But 
I could still get 20/25 visual acuity. This is grati-
fyingly good. It will be necessary, however, to 
hold up the contact lens for at least anotl~er 
month or two. We are, however, gratified \nth 
his progress. 
Most sincerely, 
James P. Rigg, Sr., :M.D. 
JPR:gf 
fi 
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J arnes Alexander, M.D. 
Moab, Utah 
My dear Alex: 
December 9, 1967 
J arnes Paul Knuckles is fantastic. He read 20/15 
with his right eye with the contact lens and a 
small correction in the rayban. This is spectacu-
lar. There [sic] little fleck of cortex which I had 
visualized which was partially obstructing has 
apparently resorbed. We think this is marvelous. 
Again wishing you and your lovely family and 
[sic] great Yuletide Season, I am, 
JPR:gf 
James Alexander, M.D. 
Moab, Utah 
My dear Alex: 
Most sincerely yours, 
James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D. 
March 4, 1968 
We did a discission on Paul Knuckles and split 
a capsular membrane which had formed. The 
day following surgery with his contact lens he 
read 20/15 - phenomenal, colossal and beyond 
anticipated hopes! 
Most sincerely, 
James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D. 
JPR:gf 
(Letters marked at Exhibit 1 to and identified in the 
Deposition of James P. Rigg, Sr., (see Rigg's Deposition 
at 29).) 
7 
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In a letter to plaintiff dated March 4 1968 
Rigg stated: ' ' Dr. 
Mr. Paul Knuckles 
Box 643 
Moab, Utah 
My dear Paul: 
March 4, 1968 
I~ was thr~lling to see you the other day and the 
visual acmty with the contacts was stupendous 
colossal and great; besides being good. ' 
Wishing you the very best, I am, 
Most sincerely yours, 
James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D. 
(Id.) Through modern medical science, plaintiff has 
essentially normal vision. Plaintiff's loss of sight has 
been recovered, remedied and rectified within the mean-
ing of the policy. 
The lower court recognized that under the policy 
there must be an effort made to restore sight but 
attempted to distinguish between sight recovered by 
surgical methods and sight recovered through "artificiaF' 
means such as lenses. Such a distinction is not warranted 
by the plain meaning of the policy. The term '' irrecover-
able" is not specifically limited in the policy to the 
recovery of vision merely through surgical procedures. 
The policy does not differentiate among various proced-
ures, designed to restore vision such as eye exercises, 
medication, corrective lenses and surgery. The policy 
merely refers to "irrecoverable" loss of sight. Physicians 
specializing in treatment of the eye are trained not only 
8 
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in surgical procedures but also in the prescribing of 
medication, corrective lenses and eye exercises. (See Tr. 
at 32.) If the policy requires that an insured submit to 
modern surgical techniques to restore vision, it should 
also require the wearing of lenses that are prescribed 
by the very doctors performing the surgery. To dis-
regard the effect of the contact lens on plaintiff's vision 
is to ignore significant, optical advancements and to 
emphasize surgical advancements only. Plaintiff's own 
physician testified that the post-surgical use of contact 
lenses with individuals suffering from a traumatic cata-
ract has been greatly developed during the last ten to 
fifteen years and is now common practice. (Deposition 
of James P. Rigg, Sr. at 35-36.) The effect of modern 
medical procedure is to replace the crystalline lens of the 
eye with a comparable-sized contact lens on the outside of 
the eye. Thus, cataract patients can now have normal 
vision and lead normal lives through the progress of 
science. Today millions of persons wear glasses and 
contact lenses comfortably, and they are not considered 
handicapped or disabled. (Tr. at 32-33.) Therefore, on 
the basis of the plain meaning of the insurance con-
tract, there is no rational basis for the lower court's 
distinction. 
The policy itself is entitled: "Insurance for Death 
or Dismemberment by Accidental Means." (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, at 3.) (Emphasis added.) The schedule of 
losses in the policy explicitly details the losses for which 
insurance was contemplated: 
1. The full amount of Insurance for Death 
or Dismemberment by Accidental Means in force 
9 
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under the Group Policy on account of the Em-
ployee at the dat~ of the accident is payable for 
~ny of the foUowmg losses: loss of life, total and 
irrecoverable loss of sight of both eyes, loss of 
both hands by severance at or above wrist-joints 
loss of both feet by severance at or above ankle~ 
joints, loss of one hand and of one foot by sever-
ance at or above wrist- and ankle-joints respec-
tively, or such loss of one hand or of one foot 
together with total and irrecoverable loss of sight 
of one eye. 
One half the amount of Insurance for Death 
or Dismemberment by Accidental Means in force 
under the Group Policy on account of the Em-
ployee at the date of the accident is payable for 
any of the following losses: loss of one hand by 
severance at or above wrist-point, loss of one 
foot by severance at or above ankle-joint, or total 
and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye. 
Id. By its express terms, the policy does not provide 
coverage unless there is an actual severance of the body 
member, or, in the case of eye injuries, unless there is 
"total and irrecoverable loss of sight." The policy docs 
not purport to insure for diminution of function or use. 
The courts have uniformly held under identical provi-
sions in other insurance contracts that actual severance 
of the body member at the designated place is necessary. 
44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §1602 (1969). When the pro-
visions relating to loss of sight are read in context with 
the provisions relating to the other body members, it 
would appear that the contracting parties were contem-
plating insurance for a blindness that could never be 
restored, just as a severed hand or foot can never be 
restored. 
10 
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Surely, if the plain meaning of words is to be given 
effect, and if the contractual relationships that were 
established on those words are to be upheld, plaintiff 
is not entitled to recover under the subject policy. A 
person who through medical science has recovered nor-
mal vision cannot at the same time have suffered the 
"total and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye." 
POINT III 
MOST OF THE DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS 
THAT ARE IN POINT DENY REVOVERY TO A 
CLAIMANT WHO HAS RECOVERED VI SI 0 N 
THROUGH CORRECTIVE LENSES. 
The trial court in the instant case erred when it 
reasoned that there is a liberal interpretation applied 
to insurance contracts requiring the "total and irrecover-
able loss of sight" so that a person who enjoys normal 
corrected vision can recover thereunder. When an in-
surance contract insures against "loss of sight," "loss 
of entire sight," "entire loss of sight," "blindness," or 
"total blindness," it is true that many courts have inter-
preted this language to mean that literal blindness is 
not required but only the loss of practical use of sight. 
See Annot., 87 A.L.R. 2d 481, 486-490 (1963). Never-
theless, there is considerable authority that has inter-
preted the same language to require total blindness. 
E.g., Gilliland v. Order of Ry. Conductors of America, 
216 Ala. 13, 112 So. 225 (1927); Sta.te Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Sewell, 223 Ga. 31, 153 S.E.2d 432 
(1967); Gibson v. Combined Insurance Co. of America, 
171 So. 2d 727 (La. 1965) ; Sump v. St. Paitl Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co., 21 Mich. App. 160, 175 N.W.2d 44, 46 
11 
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(1970); Mulcahey v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainnien, 229 
Mo. App. 610, 79 S.W.2d 759 (1934). However, when 
the insurance contract insures against the "total (or 
entire) and irrecoverable loss of sight," the courts have 
uniformly denied recovery if the claimant's vision has 
been restored through surgery and corrective lenses. 
In Wallace v. Insurance Company of North America, 
415 F. 2d 542 (6th Cir. 1969), plaintiff was insured 
against the loss of an eye which was defined as the 
"entire and irrecoverable loss of sight.'' Plaintiff was 
struck in the right eye by a metallic object and a trau-
matic cataract developed. The cataract was removed 
and plaintiff was fitted with a contact lens together with 
glasses. Plaintiff had 20/60 vision in the injured eye 
with the correction, but without the lenses could see 
only about half as well as the normal eye can see under 
clear water. Plaintiff's vision deteriorated somewhat 
because of the formation of a secondary cataract. The 
medical evidence indicated that with a "discission" opera-
tion plaintiff's vision with the prescribed lenses would 
return to 20/20. The court held that plaintiff's sight 
was not irrevocably lost since it could be completely 
or substantially restored by means of reasonably simple 
surgery and the use of artificial lenses. In reaching its 
decision, the court distinguished a Kentucky workmen's 
compensation case which did not take into account the 
effect of lenses, on the grounds that the workmen's com-
pensation statute compensated for the "total and perma-
ne•nt loss of sight of an eye." (Emphasis added.) The 
court reasoned that the term "permanent" did not re-
quire an attempt to recover sight, whereas the term 
12 
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"irrecoverable" requires that the insured make an attempt 
to determine whether sight could be recovered through 
glasses or surgery. 
In Home Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Stewart, 114 
F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1940), a policy of disability insur-
ance insured against the "irrecoverable loss of sight in 
both eyes." Plaintiff had developed cataracts in both 
eyes and through surgery had the lenses of the eyes 
removed. Wbile plaintiff's vision without glasses was 
only 20/400, with glasses plaintiff had normal vision. 
The Court reversed the lower court and held that plain-
tiff had not irrecoverably lost the sight of both eyes 
within the meaning of the policy. The Court stated: 
It is well settled in Colorado that in case of 
doubt or ambiguity a contract of insurance is to 
be construed in favor of the insured and against 
the insurer. . . . But that rule does not go to the 
extent of making a plain contract doubtful or 
ambiguous and then interpreting it in favor of 
the insured. Too, the natural and obvious mean-
ing of the provisions in a contract is to be adopted 
in preference to a fanciful, curious or hidden 
meanmg. 
The provision of the policy in question does 
not insure against the loss of the lens or any 
other physical part of the eye. It insures against 
the loss of sight. The coverage is limited by the 
plain language of the contract to the loss of func-
tion and does not embrace the loss of any part 
of the physical eye. And the loss must be irrecov-
erable. Through a cataractous condition the in-
sured lost substantially all of the sight in both 
eyes. And it may be that under the law of Colo-
rado he was not obligated to submit to surgery 
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as a prerequisite to recovery upon the policy .... 
But we do not explore that question because with 
commendable courage he voluntarily underwent 
two operations for the removal of the lenses. He 
wears glasses, and it is stipulated that with their 
use he has normal vision. No case cited by the 
parties or discovered through our own research 
is squarely in point. But in Southland Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dunn, Tex.Civ.App., 71 S.W. 2d 1103, recov-
ery was sought upon a disability policy which pro-
vided that, without prejudice to any other cause 
of disability, the entire and irrecoverable loss of 
sight in both eyes would be considered as total 
and permanent disability. Due to a cataractous 
condition, plaintiff had suffered such impairment 
of sight in both eyes as to prevent him from per-
forming the substantial duties of any occupation 
or labor, and his condition was permanent. But 
the undisputed evidence was that through removal 
of the cataracts by surgery, and the use of glasses, 
the restoration of normal or substantially normal 
vision could reasonably be expected. The court 
held that the loss of sight was not irrecoverable 
within the meaning of the policy, that instead it 
was wholly or partially recoverable, and that in 
either event recovery could not be had. That 
case seems to bear analogous application. 
* * * 
Glasses are worn by a substantial proportion 
of people of all ages. Many of them have very 
little vision in the natural eye, but with the use 
of glasses their vision is substantially nor:mal fo.r 
all practical purposes. They pursue their busi-
nesses and professions with success .. ?1he-_v: meet 
in competition those with normal yis10n m th.e 
natural eye, and they are not seriously handi-
capped. It cannot be said that they ha:e ~uff~red 
the irrecoverable loss of sight. Here it is stipu-
lated that for the purpose of this case, the insured 
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has normal '?-sion when he wears glasses. A court 
cannot say m a single judicial breath that he 
h~s ~uff ered the irrecoverable loss of his sight 
":-thm the meaning of the policy and at the same 
time that he has normal vision. The two are so 
diametrically in conflict that they cannot be 
brought into parallelism. The provision in the 
contract embraces the loss of sight by atrophy of 
the optic nerve or in some other manner which 
is irrecoverable, but it cannot be reasonably con-
strued to cover a case where sight was lost but 
through surgery and the use of glasses normal 
vision is again enjoyed. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause re-
manded. 
114 F.2d at 518. 
In the case ref erred to in the above quoted material, 
So1dhland Life Insitrance Company v. Dunn, 71 S.W.2d 
1103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), total and permanent disabil-
ity was defined as the "entire and irrecoverable loss 
of sight of both eyes." Plaintiff had a senile cataract 
in one eye and a secondary cataract in the other. The 
medical evidence indicated that both cataracts could be 
rf'moved through a relatively simple operation without 
pain or suffering and without any great risk to plain-
tiff's health and that in the vast majority of cases where 
such operations were performed and proper glasses pre-
scribed, the party's vision was either entirely or sub-
stantially restored. The lower court refused to give re-
quested instructions concerning the questions of whether 
plaintiff's vision could be restored through an operation 
and whether a reasonable man would undergo such an 
operation. Instead, the trial court apparently ignored 
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the potential effect of surgery and glasses and asked 
the jury to decide if plaintiff's impairment was "perma-
nent," meaning "a lasting disability which will not pass 
away." The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that 
the instructions were erroneous and remanded the case. 
The Court stated: 
The plaintiff's theory is that he has become 
wholly and permanently disabled because he has 
suffered the entire and irrecoverable loss of the 
sight of both eyes by the development of cataracts. 
The true fact issue is whe,ther he has suffered 
the entire and irrecoverable loss of the sight of 
both eyes. 
If so, he has become wholly and permanently 
disabled within the meaning of the policy. If the 
loss of sight is not irrecoverable, then liability 
on the part of defendant has not attached. This 
is obvious under the terms of the policy. 
Webster defines "irrecoverable" as "not to 
be recovered, regained, or remedied; as, an irre-
coverable loss." 
An entire loss of the use of a limb or organ 
of the body, which loss may be completely or sub-
stantially recovered, regained, or remedied, by 
proper medical or surgical treatment and which 
treatment would be undergone by an ordinarily 
prudent person under the same or similar cir?um-
stances, is not to be justly considered as an irre-
coverable entire loss. 
It is either a completely recoverable loss or 
a loss which is partially recoverable. 
One who sustains a broken arm suffers the 
entire loss of the use of such arm. If proper 
treatment be not had, such loss may become irre-
coverable, but no one would contend that a mere 
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?roken arm ordinarily constitutes an entire and 
urecoverable loss of its use. 
We can see no valid reason why one who 
has suffered the entire loss of sight by cataracts 
on his eyes is not governed by the same consid-
erations. The evidence is certainly sufficient to 
raise an issue as to whether an ordinarily prudent 
person under such circumstances would undergo 
an operation for removal of the cataracts. The 
evidence also shows the loss of sight may be re-
stored or substantially improved. In the one event 
the loss of sight would be recovered; in the other 
event it would be partially recovered, thus creat-
ing a partial rather than a complete disability. 
In either event the plaintiff in this case could 
not recover because under the terms of the policy 
the loss of sight in both eyes must be "entire and 
irrecoverable." 
The assignments are sustained which com-
plain of the refusal to submit the requested issues 
indicated. 
71 S.W. 2d at 1106. (Emphasis added.) 
In another case, although not directly in point, the 
effect of surgery and glasses was considered. In Pacific 
Mutual Life Insurance Compan;y v. Feldman, 99 F.2d 
83 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 636, 59 S.Ct. 
485 ( 1939), the plaintiff was insured under a disability 
policy if he became "totally and permanently unable to 
i)erform any work or engage in any occupation or pro-
fession" or if he suffered the "irrecoverable loss of the 
entire sight of both eyes." Because of cataracts, plain-
tiff's loss of vision was 93% o/o and 80o/o in his right and 
left eye, respectively. Plaintiff's right eye was oper-
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ated on and he was fitted with glasses. Thereafter, he 
had normal vision in his right eye. The Court of Appeals 
ruled that the effect of the surgery and glasses should 
have been considered by the lower court and that since 
plaintiff's eyesight had been recovered, he had not been 
permanently disabled within the meaning of the policy. 
The court ruled that a verdict should have been directed 
for the insurance company. 
In each of the foregoing cases, the courts were con-
struing private contract law and were not interpreting 
a state compensation stature. In each case, the policy 
contained provisions almost identical with the "total 
and irrecoverable loss of sight" provision of the policy 
in the instant case. In each, the court interpreted the 
policy to mean that if lost vision could be restored by 
surgery and by corrective lenses, recovery could not 
be had. These cases are the only decisions directly in 
point and represent the best reasoned view on the issues 
presented in this case. This precedent should be followed 
by this Court. 
POINT IV 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DECISIONS ARE 
NOT AUTHORITY FOR THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
IN THIS CASE. 
The trial court and counsel for plaintiff have placed 
emphasis upon the decisions of this and other courts 
involving workmen's compensation cases. Admittedly, 
this court has upheld awards of the State Industrial 
Commission which have disregarded the effect of correc-
tive lenses in the awarding of sums for total blindness. 
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See Goodyear Service Store v. Industrial Comm'n 21 
' Utah 2d 249, 444 P.2d 119 (1968); Western Contracting 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 208, 390 P.2d 
125 (1964). Nevertheless, this precedent is not authority 
in the instant case for the following reasons: 
First, in both the Goodyear Service Store case and 
the Western Contracting Company case, suprn, this 
Court def erred to the findings of the Industrial Com-
mission. In the latter case, this Court stated: 
Whether the injury resulted in total blind-
ness to the eye was within the prerogative of the 
Industrial Commission to determine. Thev hav-
ing so found under the evidence in the instant 
case, we are not persuaded that they acted capri-
ciously, arbitrarily, or unreasonably, in which 
event the award must be affirmed. 
15 Utah 2d at 210, 390 P.2d at 127. This language was 
quoted in the Goodyear Service Store case as a justifica-
tion for upholding the Commission's findings in that 
case. 21 Utah 2d at 254, 444 P.2d at 122. No doubt 
this result is motivated by the statute which provides 
that the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission 
are conclusive and final and are· not subject to review, 
Utah Code Ann. ~35-1-85 (Repl. vol. 1966), since this 
Court has also upheld a decision of the Industrial Com-
mission which did take into account the effect of glasses 
in fixing compensation for permanent disability. See 
Moray v. Industrial Oomm'n, 58 Utah 404, 416-17, 199 P. 
1023, 1028 (1921). The instant case involves no factual 
issues and this Court is obligated to determine the legal 
question involved. However, it should be pointed out 
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that the standards for blindness and for industrial com-
pensation were developed and promulgated long before 
the present medical procedure was developed to remove 
cataracts and to replace the injured lens of the eye 
with a contact lens. (Deposition of James P. Rigg, Sr. 
at 38.) Thus, the standard used by the Industrial Com-
mission, which apparently ignores significant develop-
ments in medical science, should not be the standard 
applied to the facts of this case involving a private 
insurance contract which conditions payment upon prior 
complete medical treatment. 
Second, the specific language of the Utah work-
men's compensation statute differs significantly from 
the language used in the policy of insurance in this 
case. Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 
1969), allows compensation for "total blindness of one 
eye." The insurance contract insures against the "total 
and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye." (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, under Utah's workmen's compensation, 
there is no requirment that blindness be "irrecoverable" 
as well as "total." From a legal standpoint, blindness 
may be complete or total at the time of injury and yet be 
capable of being rectified or recovered through proper 
medical treatment. See Wallace v. Insurance Company of 
North American, 415 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1969); Reliable 
Life Insurance Co. v. Steptoe, 435 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1968). Certainly, the use of this additional "irre-
coverable" requirement in the insurance policy so differ-
entiates the basic structure of the policy from the 
workmen's compensation statute that no valid compari-
son with the decisions interpreting the compensation 
statute is possible. 
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Of all the worlanen's compensation statutes in the 
United States, only the statutes of Rhode Island and 
West Virginia contain the language "total (or entire) and 
irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye.'' Rhode Island 
General Laws §28-33-19(d) (Supp. 1969); West Virginia 
Code §23-4-6 ( d) (Supp. 1970). The statutes of the other 
states are similar to Utah's in that they speak in terms 
of "total blindness," "loss of an eye,'' or "loss of sight." 
It is clear from the wording of the statutes1 that the 
Rhode Island and West Virginia legislatures conceived 
the phrase ''total (or entire) and irrecoverable loss of 
sight" to mean a loss of sight that could never be restored 
through surgery or lenses since each has made an addi-
tional provision for partial loss of sight Thus a com-
parison of the language of insurance policy in this case 
with identical language of worlanen's compensation 
statutes, demonstrates that plaintiff is not entitled to 
recovery. 
Third, even among the worlanen's compensation de-
cisions interpreting the statutes of the other states, there 
is a great unreconcilable conflict on the issue of whether 
the effect of corrective lenses should be taken into account 
in setting the award. See Lambert v. Industrial Comm'n, 
411 Ill. 593, 104 N.E. 2d 783, 788-89 (1952); 58 Am. Jur. 
I"For the entire irrecoverable loss of sight of eith~r. eye, . or 
the reduction to one tenth (1/10) or less [of] normal vision with 
glasses, or for loss of binocular vision for a period of one hundred 
sixty weeks." 
Rhode Island General Laws §28-33-19 (d) (Supp. 1969). 
"Total and irrecoverable loss of sight of on~ eye shall ~ .con~idered 
a thirty-three percent disability. For the partial loss of v1~1on m one, 
or both eyes, the percentage_ of disability shall be de~pnmed by the 
commissioner, using as a basis the total loss of one eye. 
West Virginia Code§ 23-4-6 (d) (Supp. 1970). 
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Workmen's Compensation §290, at 785 (1948); Annot., 
142 A.L.R. 822, 832-35 (1943); Annot., 73 A.L.R. 706 
' 716-18 (1931); Annot., 8 A.L.R. 1324, 1330 (1920). Even 
when the state statutes are silent on this issue, many 
of the decisions have required as a matter of law that 
the extent of vision impairment be measured only after 
glasses or other corrective means are taken into account. 
(See id.) It is submitted that if the requirement of irre-
coverableness had been used by many of the legislatures, 
most of the present conflicts in decisions would never had 
occurred. If the effect of corrective lenses is such a 
heated point under many workmen's compensation stat-
utes that are silent on the effect of lenses, certainly this 
Court should require the taking of lenses into account 
when private, contracting parties provided for coverage 
only if sight could not be recovered by any means. 
And fourth, this Court in Western Contracting Cor-
poration v. Industrial Commission, supra, recognized the 
sharp conflict in the authorities on the question of 
whether the effect of optical lenses should be considered 
in determining awards under workmen's compensation 
statutes. It was felt, however, that the Utah workmen's 
compensation statute was among those statutes most fav-
orable to the disregarding of the effect of corrective 
lenses, especially since the legislature had provided for 
reduced amounts of compensations for certain injuries 
that allowed the use of artificial limbs but had failed 
to make anv such distinction with respect to blindness. 
See 15 Ut~h 2d at 209-10. Nevertheless, if the Utah 
legislature had required the "total and irrecoverable loss 
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of sight" before a claimant could be compensated under 
the act instead of just "total blindness," there is little 
doubt that the result in the Wes tern Contracting Com-
pany case, supra, would have been different and that 
the effect of corrective lenses would have had to have 
been taken into consideration by the Commission as a 
matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has not suffered the total and irrecover-
able loss of sight in one eye. With corrective lenses, 
plaintiff enjoys normal vision. Under such conditions, 
it would be anomalous to hold that plaintiff had suffered 
the "total and irrecoverable loss of sight" within the 
meaning of the subject insurance policy. If plaintiff's 
sight is capable of being rectified through the use of a 
contact lens, he is not entitled to recover under the 
policy. The decision of the trial court should be reversed, 
with orders that defendant is entitled to a judgment 
against plaintiff dismissing the action with prejudice 
as requested in defendant's Motion to Amend the Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis 
Roger H. Thompson 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attor-neys for Appellant 
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